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Abstract 
One “problem” with the 21st century world, particularly the economic and business worlds, is the phenomenal and 
increasing number of interconnections between economic agents (consumers, firms, banks, markets, national economies). 
This implies that such agents are all interacting and consequently giving raise to enormous degrees of non-linearity, a.k.a. 
complexity. Complexity often brings with it unexpected phenomena, such as chaos and emerging behaviour, that can become 
challenges for the survival of economic agents and systems. Developing econophysics approaches are beginning to apply, to 
the “economic web”, methods and models that have been used in physics and/or systems theory to tackle non-linear domains. 
The paper gives an account of the research in progress in this field and shows its implications for enteprise information sys-
tems, anticipating the emergence of software that will allow to reflect the complexity of the business world, as holistic risk 
management becomes a mandate for financial institutions and business organizations. 
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Introduction 
The word “complexity” can take many mean-
ings, both in common parlance and in scientific or tech-
nological jargons. However, increasingly the most in-
triguing meaning is the one stemming from non-
linearity1.  
A problem is linear if it can be broken into a 
sum of mutually independent sub-problems. When, to 
the contrary, the various components/aspects of a prob-
lem interact with each other so as to render impossible 
their separation for solving the problem step by step or 
in blocks, then the situation is non-linear.  
Another way to express the same concept 
(Feynman 1964) is to use the systems theory definition: 
a system is linear if it responds with direct proportional-
ity to inputs. This is a system that obeys the superposi-
tion principle: the response at a given place and time 
caused by two or more stimuli is the sum of the re-
sponses which would have been caused by each stimu-
lus individually. 
                                                 
1 We are using the dynamic/systemic view of complexity. An-
other one is possible, i.e. the computational/structural one. 
Ultimately related to Gödel incompleteness theorems, the 
structural view is predominantly adopted in information the-
ory and computer science, where it has to do with the comput-
ability of algorithms. The two views are ultimately connected, 
although in subtle and convoluted ways, via the concept of 
entropy. 
Linearity 
The “systems” and the “problems” that are en-
countered in nature are essentially non-linear. However, 
to simplify the studies or for application purposes, one 
often resorts to linearity as a first-order approximation: 
if the effects of non-linearity can be considered negligi-
ble, a mathematical model can be built that represents 
the system as if it were linear.  
This approach is fecund in many situations. As 
an example: an audio amplifier is intrinsically non-
linear but, within certain frequency limits, it will behave 
in a linear fashion and be useful for hi-fi; hence, its de-
scription throughout audio and hi-fi literature will al-
ways be that of a linear system, even if in principle it is 
not.  
Linear models are useful because subject to the 
hypothesis of linearity many natural systems resemble 
one another: their behaviour can be described with the 
same equations even if the contexts are very different, 
such as mechanics, electronics, chemistry, biology, eco-
nomics, and so on. A linear oscillator is a model de-
scribed by the same mathematical equation, whether it 
be a metal spring, an electric circuit or a standalone El 
Niño. (Complex systems, on the contrary, each have 
their own mathematical formalization and, in many 
cases, not even that: equations are substituted by nu-
merical computer simulations.) 
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Non-linearity 
Gigantic scientific and technological advances 
have been made using simplifying linearity assump-
tions, before computers started allowing to venture into 
non-linear territory. This is how “complexity science”, 
a.k.a. “complexity theory”, was born.  
There had been, in fact, several explorations of 
non-linear territory made by scholars since the 19th cen-
tury. As an example, French mathematician and physi-
cist Henri Poincaré was the first (Poincaré 1890) to dis-
cover and describe how an apparently simple system 
subject to deterministic laws, such as that composed of 
three orbiting celestial bodies (e.g., Sun, Earth and 
Moon), can exhibit a complex (chaotic) behaviour. 
Other scholars, including, e.g., Alexander Bogdanov, 
Norbert Wiener and Warren Weaver, made advances 
and contributed creating complex system thinking in the 
first half of the 20th century (Weaver 1948).  
However, the field has acquired new lymph 
only with the advent of electronic computers, as they 
allow to simulate whenever mathematics does not do 
the job because equations are unknown.  
Fundamental, in this respect, was the work of 
mathematician and climatologist Edward Lorenz. Lo-
renz made apparent (Lorenz 1963) and formalized the 
problem that Poincaré touched upon in his three-body 
system: When observing the evolution of a complex 
system (i.e., its trajectory in state space), finite varia-
tions may originate from infinitesimal variations in the 
initial conditions. 
In other words, even two infinitely similar be-
ginnings will look different in the future, because the 
evolution of the system will differ substantially in the 
two cases, with a divergence ever-larger in time. If we 
were to model the evolution of continental weather, it 
may make a difference, to the effect of a probability of a 
tornado in Texas, whether or not «a butterfly flaps its 
wings in Brazil ». Making long-term forecasts becomes 
impossible. 
Examples of complexity 
A striking exemplification of the above is to be 
found in another small system such as the one com-
posed of a population of predator animals, a population 
of preys and the food available to the latter. A linear 
model turns out simplistic and inadequate for the situa-
tion: the population of preys is a function of the preda-
tors’ population but, in turn, the latter will expand and 
contract based on the availability of preys. These, on the 
other hand, depend of the availability of food, and eat-
ing too much of it would cause the preys population to 
contract, possibly beyond sustainability.  
The “preys – predators – food” system is in-
trinsically non-linear: none of its components may be 
studied in isolation from the others. And indeed, the 
Lotka-Volterra equations are a classical example of 
simple non-linear model of an ecological situation. Pur-
posely simplified, the Lotka-Volterra model may lead to 
the formulation of the so-called logistic map (May 
1976): 
xn+1 = r xn (1 - xn) 
 
with x0 representing the initial condition, i.e. the initial 
population at discrete time interval t0. 
 
Figure 1: The logistic map 
By varying the parameter r, a number of weird 
things happen (see Figure 1), particularly for r equal or 
greater than 3.57, when periodic oscillations (corre-
sponding to the increases and decreases of a population 
depending on ecological conditions) start being replaced 
by pure chaos.  
Thus, a “toy” ecological problem can, like 
Poincaré’s three bodies, end in chaos. In addition to 
sensitivity to the initial conditions, a second (and re-
lated) property of complex systems is indeed determi-
nistic chaos: the underlying laws (physical, biological, 
etc.) may be orderly and even deterministic, yet chaotic 
behaviour is possible. 
Complex systems can surprise  
A third essential property of complexity is 
emerging behaviour: even when the laws governing its 
components are well-known, a complex system may 
show a behaviour that cannot be explained on those 
grounds.  
Popular literature on complexity tends to fur-
nish us with examples from the living world or other 
high-level natural systems (flocks of birds and colonies 
of ants behave in ways inexplicable based on what we 
know of the capabilities of the individuals), however 
emerging behaviour has been known to physicists since 
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Phil Anderson showed it in the case of groups of elec-
trons in a semiconductor (Anderson 1972).  
This observation, along with the chaotic be-
haviour seen in very small deterministic systems, shows 
how intimately the natural world is permeated with 
complexity. It also warns us that knowing “fundamen-
tal” laws (such as those concerning elementary particles 
or individual economic agents) is insufficient to under-
stand the systemic behaviour of interacting components, 
because in non-linear systems a new behaviour may 
emerge. We need to know both the fundamental laws 
and the systemic ones. 
The origins of complexity 
What makes a system complex are the interac-
tions between the components –the ultimate cause of 
non-linearity (Bridgman 1927)–, not the number of 
components themselves.  
A system made of many non-interacting parts 
is not complex (from Latin complector: to encircle, to 
embrace firmly, to comprise, to unite under a single 
thought and a single denomination) but merely compli-
cated (from complico, to fold): it takes a long time to 
unfold it, to solve it, but it can be done step by step. 
A complex system/problem, instead, is hard to 
tackle because, in addition to the laws governing the 
components, we need to study the system’s overall be-
haviour: the analytic approach must be complemented 
with the holistic one.  
Clearly, though, an increasing number of inter-
acting components will give raise to increasing com-
plexity, possibly exponentially: complex and compli-
cated makes things worse. 
Complexity and economics 
This is why, in today’s economic world, we are 
more and more often confronted with complexity: it is 
caused by the number of interactions within (and be-
tween) the systems that surround us (Lo 2009), which 
are complex and complicated at the same time. Sources 
of complexity include:  
• global financial systems;  
• networks (such as the Internet, power grids or 
transport networks);  
• enteprises, as these are increasingly interconnected 
in supply and demand chains, ecosystems, and 
“clouds”;  
• consumers, since their behaviours are mutually in-
fluencing due to connections of all sorts (TV, mo-
bile communications, Web, social networks, email). 
Linearity dominates the current economic paradigm 
This complexity compounds with mounting 
debate around the dominant paradigm in economics, the 
Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH), which as-
sumes that economic agents (workers, consumers, 
firms, etc.) behave rationally and take all available in-
formation into account in forming expectations of eco-
nomic events (such as the price of a stock). And firmly 
on top of the REH rests the other dominating assump-
tion, i.e. that markets are efficient, cannot be “fooled”, 
and smooth out all imperfections in the large numbers 
(Efficient Markets Hypothesis, EMH).  
This paradigm is challenged on at least two 
fronts. One is behavioural finance/economics (Kahne-
man 1979), where researchers have proved that homo 
economicus is far from making rational choices, much 
less to have rational expectations of future events. The 
second front is indeed the complexity-driven camp.  
The REH assumes that any market is always in 
the surroundings of its equilibrium (a point, line, sur-
face, volume or hypervolume in a state space), and that 
perturbations around such state may only be small and 
linear. The perturbations are small because the actual 
price of a good (commodity, stock, …) is at any time 
given by 
P = P* + ε 
 
where P*=price expected and ε is an infinitely small 
quantity. They are linear because ε is independent of P* 
and, more importantly, because the resulting statistical 
models assume that the risk of every individual invest-
ment/asset can be assessed in separation of the risk of 
other investments/assets: each individual risk is a Gaus-
sian distribution (of the values of the variable/asset un-
der consideration) where the standard deviation is the 
measure of the asset’s volatility.  
Need of an holistic approach 
It follows that REH may be good at assessing 
the risk of each and every individual investment, but the 
assumption of zero interdependence between invest-
ments is an over-simplification that depicts an inher-
ently complex domain as if it were a linear one, thereby 
causing statistical models to underestimate –or miss al-
together– systemic effects.  
It can be argued (Bouchaud 2008) that markets 
of the 21st century global world can no longer be mod-
elled as linear systems. It is therefore not a surprise that 
REH-based economics be clueless at anticipating 
shocks such as the one in Asia 1997 or the subprime 
crisis culminated in the 2008 financial meltdown. 
(REH/EMH proponents counter-object that the 2008 
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financial crash was not but the efficient-market antici-
pation of a to-be economic recession. According to this 
view, finance was the victim, not the cause, of the 
economy meltdown (Cassidy 2010)). 
The non-linearity of the global financial sys-
tem cannot be captured by most REH constructs, and in 
the increasingly interconnected “economic web” 
(Kauffman 1995) it is essential to have estimates of sys-
temic, global risk, not just the many views of all indi-
vidual variables: this is because chaos may originate 
from the combined actions of different agents through 
their interconnections. Emerging behaviour may take 
place, it should be noted, whether or not the individual 
economic agents are believed to be rational: all it takes 
is that they interact and influence each others signifi-
cantly.  
It follows that an holistic approach to financial 
markets or economic systems can hardly be based on 
REH/EMH and that a radical new view of the world 
may be needed. While economists are of course aware 
of the limitations of the current paradigm (Scarf 1960) 
(Sonnenschein 1972) (Stiglitz 1975) (Anderson 1988), 
proposals for its radical reform seem to come more fre-
quently from outside the economic community, or from 
its outskirts. 
Econophysics 
Radical new views are being attempted in 
econophysics, a discipline born in the mid-1990’s that is 
trying to a) import more elements of empirical research 
in economics (a discipline currently resembling more 
mathematics than physics) and b) have economics re-
search adopt some of the methods devised in the natural 
sciences for describing complex systems. (A broader, if 
banal, view of econophysics describes it as a discipline 
aimed at using in general the mathematical methods of 
physics in the economy: however, this has been done all 
the time since Leon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto, in the 
19th century).  
Non-linearity, systems operating far from equi-
librium, and “organized disorder” (deterministic chaos, 
emerging behaviour) are the tools of the trade in econo-
physics today: just about the opposite of what happens 
in the REH/EMH paradigm, where markets have no in-
ternal dynamics (no interconnections between individ-
ual agents and choices) and chaos may only be stochas-
tic, i.e., the “disorganized complexity” (Weaver 1948) 
of brownian motion and equilibrium thermodynamics. 
Some physicists and a few “maverick” economists are 
increasingly recognizing in complex models of the 
physical world (especially, although not only, con-
densed matter) situations that resemble economic or fi-
nancial contexts.  
Proposed new models 
One such model is that of spin glasses (Parisi 
1983) (Anderson 1988), a domain characterized by an 
extreme fragility with respect to small changes in pa-
rameters and the de facto absence of equilibrium. An-
other one, and considered more promising by many 
(Bouchaud 2009), is heterogeneous mean-field ap-
proximation (Mézard 2009), where the problem of N 
interacting particles is treated as that of a single particle 
immersed in a chosen field of forces. Yet another model 
is the one presented in (De Laurentis 2009), where a 
thermodynamics of non equilibrium approach is taken 
to show the analogy between Prigogine’s dissipative 
structures and financial markets.  
A vast class of models are agent-based models: 
here, the domain under investigation is explored via 
computer-based simulation, a technique much more ac-
cepted in physics (and chemistry and biology) than in 
economic research, where, according to many, it should 
be pursued more actively.  
Numerical investigation of a model does not 
prove anything, yet provides a formidable tool, a «tele-
scope of the mind multiplying human powers of analy-
sis and insight just as a telescope does our powers of 
vision» (Buchanan 2008).  
In the case of econophysics studies, simula-
tions often consist in defining economic agents (people, 
firms, banks, regulators, …) and the rules of the game, 
then letting the game run to study the possible out-
comes. Agent-based simulations, sometimes also re-
ferred to as complex adaptive systems or cellular auto-
mata, were inaugurated by John H. Conway (Gardner 
1970) and first formalized in (Holland 1975). It is im-
pressive to notice how, given extremely simple “organ-
isms” or “agents” and a few governing rules (1 organ-
ism and 4 simple rules in Conway’s game), rich and 
complex forms of  “life” can evolve over time.  
Econophysics simulations of this sort often 
lead to situations very different from the perpetual 
quasi-equilibrium of efficient markets. For example, 
catastrophic meltdowns can take place abruptedly, 
something that in EMH models may happen only with 
infinitely low probabilities (contrary to empirical evi-
dence). Examples of this kind of simulations are to be 
found in, e.g., (Thurner 2010), (Westerhoff 2004) or 
(Macal 2004). 
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The enterprise level: the challenge 
As the world’s complexity increases, crises, 
including nearly-catastrophic ones such as that of 2008, 
can be expected to become more and more frequent. 
Such crises may include sudden perturbations in finan-
cial markets or segments of the economy, or shocks in 
increasingly complex supply chains and industrial eco-
systems (Sodhi 2010).  
Shocks can propagate in unexpected ways and 
affect systems or subsystems deemed to be only very 
loosely coupled with the one first hit. A sudden finan-
cial crisis may mean death for just about any financial 
company and, for that matter, companies of any kind, as 
we witnessed in 2008-2009 when all OECD countries 
experienced sharp declines in Gross Domestic Products. 
Although the final word rests on the economic 
research community (econophysicists included), and 
despite the fact that econophysics results seem a bit 
overstated nowadays (Gallegati 2006), it seems plausi-
ble that there be a need for more-realistic economic 
laws allowing us to achieve a better grasp of heavily 
non-linear phenomena which we currently treat as if 
they were linear and, presumably because of that, seem 
not to conform to any known statistics.  
If such laws are discovered, it will take a long 
time, due to the intellectual challenges implied, the 
scarcity of methods for tackling complexity even in the 
natural sciences, the intricacies of interdisciplinary col-
laboration, the impossibility of controlled experiments 
in macroeconomy and the consequent dominance of 
axiomatic approaches and attitudes in economics, the 
current limited participation of economists in econo-
physics research, and, last but not least, the inertia of 
academia (it is easier to win a tenure or a PhD assign-
ment by participating in a study that resonates with the 
dominant paradigm than by venturing in distant and 
subversive territories).  
Systemic risk management and complexity as a 
proxy of risk 
While we wait for a “new paradigm for eco-
nomics” to develop, whether from econophysics or out 
of elsewhere, the increasing uncertainty of their envi-
ronment will force businesses to implement holistic risk 
management, i.e. the capability to assess the risk of an 
entire system as opposed to just that of its components 
(Lo 2009). This is a must for financial institutions, but a 
requirement for corporations at large, too, since sur-
vival, not growth, may be the name of the game in the 
future business atmosphere, dominated by uncertainty 
and fragility (Marczyk 2009).  
The “system”, in this case, is as simple to 
name as is difficult to monitor and control: it is the firm 
itself, in its whole entirety and complexity, immersed in 
a wider ecosystem. 
Even in financial companies, risk management 
(RM) is traditionally split into separate concerns. Op-
erational RM on one side, with the task of ensuring 
process integrity, continuity of business and security; 
and credit and market RM on the other, to protect and 
exploit counterparty exposures and market develop-
ments.  
All this has historically been limited to audit, 
compliance, treasury and insurance areas, dominated by 
a passive/reactive attitude, with little or no coordination 
across the enterprise, a lack of analytical tools, and 
modest information technology (IT) support (Gartner 
2008).  
As it is understood today, holistic (or “inte-
grated”, or “systemic”) RM is to become a process that 
permeates the entire firm and its ecosystem/supply 
chain, spanning not just risk areas but also strategic 
goals. From that perspective, there is a need to develop, 
among other things: 
• real-time predictive analysis and reporting of risk, 
including agent-based simulation; 
• infra- and inter-enterprise workflow connectivity 
and sharing of information;  
• common risk management processes through the 
supply chain/ecosystem;  
• XML-based standards for risk data definitions;  
and possibly an integrated-risk data warehouse for the 
enterprise. 
Conclusions: the opportunity 
Therefore, the intrusion of complex thinking 
and holistic/systemic risk management in the enterprise 
will entail a) the acquisition and/or building of sophisti-
cated software tools and b) the definition of adequate 
processes and the integration of the new tools with the 
enterprise’s information systems (IS). 
Software tools will consist of a new generation 
of business intelligence products which, we predict, will 
be based on complexity technology, as complexity is 
the driver of systemic risk.  
Fields like electronics, optronics, avionics, 
chemistry, biology, ecology and econophysics are pro-
viding plenty of examples where non-linear system dy-
namics models and simulation scenarios are used to 
control, manage and exploit complex systems. Enter-
prises will use these “probes” to explore their environ-
ment searching for potential complexity peaks, as well 
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as to assess their own (and their supply chains’) levels 
of complexity, fragility and uncertainty.  
Measuring complexity 
Tools will need to 
• know ways of communicating sophisticated system 
concepts, variables and parameters to business peo-
ple;  
• provide quantitative measures/estimates of com-
plexity (and consequent risk) that be simple, syn-
thetic and actionable;  
• effect what-if analyses, for example via agent-
based simulation, of potentially chaotic situations;  
• provide pictorial representations of complexity sce-
narios (e.g.: depict attractors in state space and the 
expected probabilities for the system to hang 
around them); 
• analyse the enterprise’s complexity drivers, then its 
partners’, then merge them all; 
• analyse the entire world’s complexity drivers and 
dynamics, using mash-up applications that leverage 
various Web sources;  
• proactively propose countermeasures aimed at re-
ducing systemic risk. 
One major challenge in view of developing 
this class of tools is to decide how to assess/measure 
complexity. Early approaches have already materialized 
in industrial products. As an example, (Ontonix 2008) 
presents a tool that quantifies complexity of both the 
enterprise and its environment and provides simple and 
manageable outputs: the underlying methodology is un-
disclosed, and personal communications received by 
this author seem to indicate that the tool assesses com-
plexity by looking at the degree of correlation between 
up to hundreds of randomly selected parameters of an 
enterprise’s performance. 
An emerging new class of software and market 
In addition to complexity assessment tools, 
which will be provided by specialized vendors (includ-
ing, one would presume, the incumbent business intelli-
gence companies), there will be a need to establish an 
enterprise and an inter-enterprise architecture and inte-
gration framework allowing to monitor systemic risk. 
This means that, in addition to ad-hoc processes, there 
will be software spanning all or most of the enteprise’s 
IS.  
Therefore, the application of complexity-based 
risk management technologies to enterprises in all in-
dustry sectors is a huge opportunity for the software in-
dustry. This will be a significant market not just for spe-
cialized and niche IT vendors providing new risk man-
agement tools, but also for major enterprise software 
(business intelligence, supply-chain management, etc.) 
vendors to integrate their software with the former and 
to provide sustainable human interfaces.  
Growing economic complexity constitutes at 
the same time a challenge and a blessing for IT re-
searchers, practitioners and vendors. 
A bigger picture? 
But the systemic risk management transforma-
tion and the growing awareness of the role being played 
by complexity will probably have an even bigger im-
pact.  
The accelerated shrinking of business planning 
horizons, the increasing financial and economic turbu-
lence, and the impending chaotic behaviour of ecosys-
tems may create a situation where the primary business 
goal will be survival. Keeping overall risk below a cer-
tain numeric level could then become as valuable, and 
as much remunerated, as achieving EBITDA (earnings 
before income tax, depreciation and amortization) tar-
gets, because risk is indeed the uncertainty of achieving 
such goals.   
If that happens, new methods of enterprise 
success and valuation will emerge, and this would trans-
form information systems radically. Today, information 
systems are optimized for enterprise growth and profit: 
but if these become secondary objectives and mastery in 
uncertainty management rises to be the key perform-
ance indicator, a Copernican revolution may take place. 
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